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I.  Introduction 
“The arbitrator’s decision should be the end, not the beginning of the dispute.”1 Arbitrators 
possess a great deal of authority in terms of their latitude to fashion and grant an arbitration 
award. Yet, after having spent a significant amount of time, effort, and money in (1) deciding 
to arbitrate rather than litigate; (2) choosing between private, ad hoc arbitration and 
institutional arbitration; (3) selecting an arbitrator or panel of arbitrators; and (4) obtaining a 
favorable arbitration award, the prevailing party must also confront the challenge of 
enforcing the hard-sought-after award, where the arbitration may “contemplate[] a binding 
decision with the legal effect of a final judgment of a court.”2 
An arbitrator lacks imperium—the power to command the force of the state to enforce the 
law as a judge sitting in court is able to do.3 In other words, even if an arbitrator possesses 
relatively free reign vis-à-vis the authority vested in him or her by the parties to create an 
arbitral award by formulating all of its terms and conditions embodied therein, the arbitrator 
does not share the corresponding authority to breathe life into, or transform the words 
documenting the judgment, into a tangible, material award that the prevailing party actually 
wants and needs to procure. The document that captures the award penned onto it is merely 
that—a piece of paper. The prevailing party may carry this piece of paper around with him 
because it declares that he is indeed the “winner,” but other than that, it is essentially 
worthless. The arbitration process does not conclude upon the rendering of an award by the 
arbitrator(s), but rather when the losing party (or both parties, depending on the terms) 
carries out and fulfills the terms and conditions specified therein. Thus, a meaningful arbitral 
award, or one that is or will be brought to fruition, is absolutely contingent upon an 
effectively and reliably functioning mechanism that grants the authority to enforce.4 
The enforcement of arbitral awards involving foreign parties and/or awards rendered in 
foreign countries becomes even more complex than that of an exclusively domestic judgment 
rendered within a domestic jurisdiction as the former are vulnerable, exposed to the 
uncertainties of conflicting laws. The manner of and authority for enforcement may depend 
upon a number of different considerations, such as the law governing the arbitration 
agreement, the place of arbitration, or the place where the arbitral award is to be enforced. 
Yet, compared to a foreign court judgment, the enforcement of arbitral awards involving 
foreign aspects is much more straightforward and efficient due to the New York Convention.5 
The New York Convention provides an influential mechanism for enforcing both 
arbitration agreements and arbitral awards among its 148 (as of December 2012) contracting 
                                                                                                                               
 1. ARTHUR J. GEMMELL, WESTERN AND CHINESE ARBITRATION: THE ARBITRAL CHAIN 17 (2008) 
(quoting Moncharsh v. Heily & Blasé, 3 Cal. 4th 1, 10 (1992)). 
 2. Id. (citing Henry P. de Vries, International Commercial Arbitration: A Contractual Substitute for 
National Courts, 57 TUL. L. REV. 42, 47 (1982)). 
 3. FOUCHARD GAILLARD GOLDMAN ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 414 (Emmanuel 
Gaillard & John Savage, eds., 1999). 
 4. GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN THE UNITED STATES 460 (1994). 
 5. United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 
10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter New York Convention or Convention]. 
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states.6 It requires each contracting state to recognize and enforce arbitral awards entered in 
the territory of another state, as well as those awards that a contracting state considers non-
domestic.7 Nevertheless, although the Convention was drafted with the purpose of affecting 
cooperation and uniformity, the implementation of the Convention within domestic courts 
inevitably differs from one contracting state to another and even among the courts within a 
contracting state.8 Since it would be practically impossible to institute a universally uniform 
procedure for 148 different legal systems, each contracting state must determine its own 
implementation of the Convention accordingly, pursuant to the respective state’s legal 
system.9 
Article I(1) of the Convention states that it applies to both arbitral awards “made in the 
territory of a State other than the State where the recognition and enforcement of such 
awards are sought” and those “not considered as domestic awards in the State where their 
recognition and enforcement are sought.”10 First, this Comment will focus only on the latter 
part of Article I(1), or the methodology of enforcing non-domestic arbitral awards rendered in 
the United States. Second, this Comment will introduce and compare the enforcement 
methodology of Chinese courts with respect to “foreign-related” arbitral awards rendered 
within the People’s Republic of China, pursuant to the Convention. 
II.  Enforcing Non-Domestic Arbitral Awards Rendered in the 
United States 
A. The Federal Arbitration Act 
The United States Arbitration Act—also called the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)—was 
passed in 1925.11 It was modeled after 1920 New York legislation and “designed to reverse 
the prevailing judicial attitude that had been antagonistic to contracts ‘ousting’ or depriving 
courts of jurisdiction to hear disputes.”12 The FAA is composed of three chapters: Chapter 1, 
or the Domestic FAA, articulates the rules for recognizing and enforcing arbitration 
agreements and awards in both domestic and international contexts;13 Chapter 2, enacted in 
                                                                                                                               
 6. Status of the 1958 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 
UNCITRAL, 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/NYConvention_status.html (last 
visited Dec. 4, 2012). 
 7. New York Convention, supra note 5, art. I. 
 8. See Bergesen v. Joseph Muller Corp., 710 F.2d 928, 929 (2d Cir. 1983) (explaining the difficulty of 
construing the New York Convention, the Bergesen court wrote: “The family of nations has 
endlessly—some say since the Tower of Babel—sought to breach the barrier of language. As 
illustrated by the proceedings at this conference, the delegates had to comprehend concepts familiar 
in one state that had no counterpart in others and to compromise entrenched and differing national 
commercial interests. Concededly, 45 nations cannot be expected to produce a document with the 
clear precision of a mathematical formula. Faced with the formidable obstacles to agreement, the 
wonder is that there is a Convention at all, much less one that is serviceable and enforceable.”). 
 9. Id. 
 10. New York Convention, supra note 5, art. I(1). 
 11. EDWARD BRUNET ET AL., ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THE ADVOCATE’S PERSPECTIVE 447 (3d 
ed. 2006). 
 12. Id. 
 13. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2006). 
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1970, incorporates and implements the New York Convention;14 and Chapter 3, enacted in 
1990, encompasses the Inter-American Convention on International Commercial 
Arbitration.15 Chapter 1 applies to all arbitration cases.16 In fact, the legislation enacting the 
New York Convention expressly articulates that Chapter 1 of the FAA “applies to actions and 
proceedings brought under [it] to the extent that chapter [1] is not in conflict with” the 
respective Chapters or the Conventions themselves.17 
In terms of enforcing arbitral awards, an award is of little value and will affect minimal 
impact if it lacks a means of easy enforcement.18 The drafters of the FAA thereby provided 
that courts “must grant . . . an order” confirming an arbitral award “[i]f the parties in their 
agreement have agreed that a judgment of the court shall be entered upon the award.”19 In 
the United States, an application for court enforcement of awards must be made within one 
year after the award is rendered.20 The combined impact of the FAA and standard arbitration 
practice, where arbitration clauses generally provide that parties agree the awards will be 
entered as civil judgments, is that U.S. arbitration awards then become the equivalent of 
enforceable court judgments.21 
The issue of enforcing arbitral awards within the international context is of particular 
significance due to the modern needs of international trade that demand an efficiently 
operating dispute resolution system.22 By adopting the New York Convention, a party to an 
international or foreign-related arbitration may apply to a U.S. court for an order confirming 
the award.23 
B. The New York Convention 
The New York Convention is one of the most important international treaties on the 
enforcement of arbitral awards. It was drafted under the close observation and guidance of 
the United Nations, and ratified on December 29, 1970.24 It is important to note that in the 
United States, ratified treaties—alongside the U.S. Constitution and federal statutes—are 
considered the supreme law of the land, which judges in every state are bound to uphold.25 
The Convention, however, does not apply directly to federal or state courts in the United 
States. Rather, it is implemented through domestic legislation as provided in § 201 of the 
FAA.26 With respect to enforcing awards, Article I of the New York Convention states that it 
applies to both arbitral awards “made in the territory of a State other than the State where 
                                                                                                                               
 14. 9 U.S.C. §§ 201–08 (2006) (codifying the eight articles of the New York Convention). 
 15. 9 U.S.C. §§ 301–07 (2006). 
 16. Productos Mercantiles e Industriales, S.A. v. Faberge U.S.A., Inc., 23 F.3d 41, 45 (2d Cir. 1994). 
 17. 9 U.S.C. § 208. 
 18. BRUNET ET AL., supra note 11, at 665. 
 19. 9 U.S.C. § 9. 
 20. Id. 
 21. BRUNET ET AL., supra note 11, at 665. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. JULIAN D.M. LEW ET AL., COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 20–22 (2003). 
 25. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 26. See 9 U.S.C. § 201 (2006) (providing that the New York Convention “shall be enforced in United 
States courts in accordance with [Chapter 2 of the Convention Act]”). 
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the recognition and enforcement of such awards are sought” and those “not considered as 
domestic awards in the State where their recognition and enforcement are sought.”27 Section 
202 of the FAA, on the other hand, provides that the New York Convention applies generally 
to any arbitration agreement or award arising out of a legal relationship, whether contractual 
or not, that is considered commercial, i.e. a transaction, contract, or agreement.28 Section 202 
further states that the Convention would not apply if the relationship is composed entirely of 
U.S. citizens “unless that relationship involves property located abroad, envisages 
performance or enforcement abroad, or has some other reasonable relation with one or more 
foreign states.”29   
The scope of New York Convention awards, as defined under U.S. legislation, appears to 
be inconsistent with the scope as provided under Article I of the Convention. This slight 
disconnect is likely due to the fact that the Convention does not expressly define a “non-
domestic award.” In turn, this silence extends to each member state the liberty to set forth its 
own respective criterion for consideration of “non-domestic” awards. The relevant section of 
Article I(1) stipulates only that: “[The Convention] shall also apply to arbitral awards not 
considered as domestic awards in the State where their recognition and enforcement are 
sought.”30 Its failure to elaborate, or even articulate any specific elements or factors that 
would constitute or facilitate the determination of a “non-domestic” award is therefore 
construed as inviting each member state to interpret such criterion for implementation 
within its own jurisdiction. Thus, in order to ascertain if an award appropriately qualifies as 
“non-domestic,” one should defer to the law of the member state where recognition and 
enforcement are being sought. With respect to how Article I(1) of the Convention is 
implemented in the United States, it appears, judging by the language of § 202, that Congress 
took advantage of the Convention’s general provision by enacting an equally, if not broader 
definition for a “non-domestic” award, where an award is considered “non-domestic” if it 
involves any foreign-related aspects, even if both parties are U.S. citizens. 
1. Defining “Non-Domestic” 
In terms of a “non-domestic” arbitration agreement, § 202 imposes a “somewhat more 
restrictive” requirement on the application of the Convention than the Convention’s own 
corresponding provision.31 Article II only requires each Contracting State to recognize an 
arbitration agreement in writing, whereas § 202 excludes arbitration agreements entirely 
between U.S. citizens, unless that relationship involves “property located abroad, envisages 
performance or enforcement abroad, or has some other reasonable relation with one or more 
foreign states.”32 
                                                                                                                               
 27. New York Convention, supra note 5, art. I(1). 
 28. 9 U.S.C. § 202 (2006). 
 29. Id. 
 30. New York Convention, supra note 5, art. I(1). 
 31. John P. McMahon, Implementation of the United Nations Convention on Foreign Arbitral Awards in 
the United States, 2 J. MAR. L. & COM. 735, 739 (1971). 
 32. New York Convention, supra note 5, art. II; 9 U.S.C. § 202. For the purposes of this statute, a 
corporation is a citizen of the United States if it is incorporated or has its principal place of business 
in the United States. Id. 
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The Seventh Circuit determined, in Jain v. de Méré, that a written arbitration agreement 
between foreign nationals was “non-domestic.”33 Jain, an Indian citizen, entered into a 
marketing contract with de Méré, a French patentee, and Jain subsequently sought to compel 
arbitration over a percentage of royalties paid to de Méré by an Illinois company.34 de Méré 
objected because the contract was silent as to the arbitration location.35 The court 
nevertheless applied the FAA, which governs the enforcement, validity, and interpretation of 
arbitration clauses in commercial contracts in both state and federal courts.36 
Since Chapter 2 of the FAA implements the Convention, the dispute between Jain and de 
Méré fell accordingly within the Convention’s domain. The agreement satisfied Article II(1) 
because it was written, and the court interpreted § 202 to indicate that an arbitral agreement 
is “not domestic” if it is not between two United States citizens. Additionally, § 203 stipulates 
that “[a]n action or proceeding falling under the Convention shall be deemed to arise under 
the laws and treaties of the United States . . . [where t]he district courts of the United 
States . . . shall have original jurisdiction over such an action or proceeding.”37 Since both 
parties were not United States citizens—Jain being an Indian national and de Méré a French 
national—and the relationship between them was commercial—breach of contract over 
royalties for a patent—the court had original jurisdiction and held the dispute “non-
domestic,” which appropriately came under the Convention.38 
Because the Convention creates such a strong presumption in favor of arbitration, federal 
courts, in their implementation of the Convention, have applied the underlying congressional 
intent rather than abiding strictly to the technical letter.39 For example, the Court required 
the parties in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver to arbitrate a fraud claim brought under federal 
securities laws because the underlying contract between the parties was “truly 
international.”40 In Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., the Court 
required arbitration for an international antitrust dispute, even though most U.S. courts had 
generally found antitrust claims not to be arbitrable.41 Scherk and Mitsubishi thereby 
emphasize the “hospitable reception toward international arbitration by the Supreme 
Court.”42 
The question of what constitutes a “non-domestic award” is one of the most complicated 
issues posed by the Convention.43 The Second Circuit was the first court to address the 
concept and attempt to define the scope of its application under the Convention in the 
                                                                                                                               
 33. Jain v. de Méré, 51 F.3d 686, 689 (7th Cir. 1995). 
 34. Id. at 688. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. (citing Allied-Bruce Terminix Companies, Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995)). 
 37. Id. at 689 (citing 9 U.S.C. § 203) (first alteration in original). 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 688–89. 
 40. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 515 (1974). 
 41. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985). 
 42. BRUNET ET AL., supra note 11, at 442. 
 43. Albert Jan van den Berg, When Is an Arbitral Award Nondomestic Under the New York Convention 
of 1958?, 6 PACE L. REV. 25, 26 (1985). 
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Bergesen case.44 Bergesen v. Joseph Muller Corp. involved a dispute between a Norwegian 
owner of cargo vessels (Bergesen) and a Swiss charterer of the vessels (Joseph Muller Corp.) 
concerning the performance of international transportation contracts.45 The arbitration took 
place in New York, where the arbitrators rendered an award in favor of Bergesen.46 The 
District Court for the Southern District of New York confirmed the award, holding that the 
Convention applied to an award rendered in the United States involving foreign interests.47 
The circuit court affirmed.48 
In its discussion of what qualifies as a “non-domestic” award under the Convention, the 
Second Circuit observed that the definition for it “appears to have been left out deliberately in 
order to cover as wide a variety of eligible awards as possible, while permitting the enforcing 
authority to supply its own definition of ‘non-domestic’ in conformity with its own national 
law.”49 Furthermore, the court decided that a non-domestic award is an award “made within 
the legal framework of another country” and provided two examples: those awards that are 
(1) made in accordance with a foreign law; and (2) involve parties domiciled or having their 
principal place of business outside the enforcement jurisdiction.50 The court reasoned that 
this broader construction was “more in line with the intended purpose of the [Convention], 
which was entered into to encourage the recognition and enforcement of international 
arbitration awards.”51 
The court also concluded that § 202 intended to ensure the enforcement of arbitral awards 
with reasonable foreign relationships.52 To this end, Bergesen fell appropriately under § 202 
because the case did not exclusively involve U.S. citizens. The relationship between the two 
parties, based entirely upon international transportation contracts, is also considered 
sufficiently “commercial” according to the court’s broad interpretation.53 
                                                                                                                               
 44. Bergesen v. Joseph Muller Corp., 710 F.2d 928, 932 (2d Cir. 1983). See also Andros Compania 
Maritima, S.A. v. Marc Rich & Co., A.G., 579 F.2d 691, 699 n.11 (2d Cir. 1978) (observing the 
application of the Convention to local arbitration awards as “intriguing,” but the court did not feel 
the need to decide on this issue because the application of Chapter 1 of the FAA sufficiently resolved 
the issue). 
 45. Bergesen, 710 F.2d 928. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 932. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. (citing Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974)). 
 52. See id. at 933 (stating that “[h]ad Congress desired to exclude arbitral awards involving two foreign 
parties rendered within the United States from enforcement by our courts it could readily have done 
so. It did not. Additional support for the view that awards rendered in the United States may 
qualify for enforcement under the Convention is found in the remaining sections of the 
implementing statute. It has been held that § 203 of the statute provides jurisdiction for disputes 
involving two aliens. Section 204 supplies venue for such an action and § 206 states that ‘[a] court 
having jurisdiction under this chapter may direct that arbitration be held . . . at any place therein 
provided for, whether that place is within or without the United States’ (emphasis supplied). It would 
be anomalous to hold that a district court could direct two aliens to arbitration within the United 
States under the statute, but that it could not enforce the resulting award under legislation which, 
in large part, was enacted for just that purpose.” (citations omitted)). 
 53. See Island Territory of Curacao v. Solitron Devices, Inc., 356 F. Supp. 1, 13 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (finding 
the contract between a United States manufacturer and foreign government concerning the 
construction of factory buildings for manufacturer to be “clearly . . . ‘commercial’ ”). 
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The Bergesen decision profoundly influenced “non-domestic” awards in U.S. courts.54 So 
far, the Second Circuit has followed the decision as binding legal authority. In terms of the 
reaction to Bergesen, European commentators have criticized the decision for reaching beyond 
the boundaries of the Convention and threatening its implementation.55 In addition, critics 
were concerned with the risk of Bergesen rendering U.S. enforcement of locally-entered 
awards involving two foreign parties more cumbersome: First, the enforcement of such 
awards may be subject to challenges under both Chapter 1 of the FAA and the Convention.56 
Second, applying the Convention could impose a higher standard for written agreements than 
the lesser requirements in the domestic FAA.57 Yet, since applying the Convention to an 
award between two foreign parties grants U.S. courts federal jurisdiction to enforce an award 
that they would not otherwise be able to enforce due to a lack of the required diversity 
elements,58 these commentators have conceded that Bergesen “makes the United States a 
more hospitable forum for foreign parties intending to arbitrate within the United States.”59 
While Bergesen represents the expanding application of the Convention in U.S. courts, 
Lander Co. v. MMP Investments, Inc. further defines “non-domestic” awards in the United 
States.60 The Bergesen court used foreign nationalities of parties as the basis for a “non-
domestic” award.61 The court, however, addressed neither the relationship between the FAA 
and the Convention, nor the impact of the “reciprocity reservation” on “non-domestic” 
awards.62 These issues were examined by the Seventh Circuit in Lander. 
Lander involved a contract performance dispute between Lander (a New Jersey company), 
and MMP Investments (an Illinois company), who had entered into an agreement requiring 
                                                                                                                               
 54. Bergesen has been cited in eighty-two cases and has been cited eighty-one times in law review 
articles. Shepard’s Summary, Bergesen v. Joseph Muller Corp., 710 F.2d 928 (2d Cir. 1983) 
(LexisNexis) (last visited Dec. 4, 2012). 
 55. Van den Berg, supra note 43, at 46. See also Filip de Ly, The Place of Arbitration in the Conflict of 
Laws of International Commercial Arbitration: An Exercise in Arbitration Planning, 12 NW. J. INT’L 
L. & BUS. 48, 77 (1991) (criticizing Bergesen as a case inspired by U.S. law and one which may pose 
a threat to the New York Convention-based system, characterized by judicial review of the award in 
the home country and by relatively limited control in the enforcing country). 
 56. See Van den Berg, supra note 43, at 54–55 (observing that a losing party may defend itself in 
recognition and enforcement proceedings according to the FAA and the Convention, and that a 
losing party may also petition to set aside the award under either Chapter 1 of the FAA or state 
arbitration law). 
 57. See id. at 56 (observing that the New York Convention requires a more stringent written agreement 
than do the FAA or most U.S. state arbitration laws). 
 58. 9 U.S.C. § 203 (2006) (stating that an action or proceeding that falls under the Convention is 
deemed to arise under the laws and treaties of the United States, thus granting federal district 
courts—including those enumerated in 28 U.S.C. § 460—original jurisdiction over such action or 
proceeding, regardless of the amount in controversy). The courts under 28 U.S.C. § 460 include the 
United States Court of Federal Claims and each court created by Act of Congress in a territory 
which is invested with any jurisdiction of a district court of the United States, and to the judges 
thereof. 28 U.S.C. § 460 (2006). 
 59. Van den Berg, supra note 43, at 50. 
 60. Lander Co. v. MMP Invs., Inc. (Lander I), 927 F. Supp. 1078 (N.D. Ill. 1996), rev’d, 107 F.3d 476 (7th 
Cir. 1997). 
 61. Bergesen v. Joseph Muller Corp., 710 F.2d 928, 932 (2d Cir. 1983). 
 62. See id. at 932–33 (responding to the argument that the court should interpret the Convention 
narrowly based on the reciprocity reservation the United States adopted, but not addressing 
whether the reciprocity reservation prevents the Convention from applying to awards entered in the 
United States). 
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Lander’s products to be distributed by MMP Investments in Poland.63 The arbitration took 
place in New York City with an award rendered in favor of Lander.64 Lander applied to the 
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois to confirm the award under the 
Convention.65 On the first issue of whether the United States’ reciprocity reservation limited 
the recognition of non-domestic awards, the court concluded that the reciprocity reservation, 
“by its express terms, limits the enforcement and recognition of arbitral awards on a 
territorial basis, that is, to those made in a country other than the United States.”66 The 
Seventh Circuit reversed, reasoning that the “reciprocity reservation” should be understood to 
limit the United States from applying the Convention to arbitral awards made in the territory 
of “another signatory of the Convention, like the United States, as opposed to 
nonsignatories.”67 In other words, the United States would only enforce arbitral awards made 
by contracting states, or signatories of the Convention.68 It is also worth noting that § 202 of 
the FAA authorizes the enforcement of arbitral awards in disputes wholly between U.S. 
citizens if the dispute arises out of a contract involving performance in a foreign country.69 
With respect to the overlap between the FAA and the Convention, the court claimed, after 
examining the legislative history of both the FAA and the Convention, that it could not find 
any suggestion that the Convention was meant to be applied exclusively.70 On the contrary, 
Article VII provides that it will not “deprive any interested party of any right he may have to 
avail himself of an arbitral award in the manner and to the extent allowed by the law or the 
treaties of the country where such award is sought to be relied upon.”71 Parties thus have 
discretion to choose Article I, § 202, or both, in seeking to enforce arbitral awards.72 
Applying the Convention to a broader scope of non-domestic awards offers the benefits of 
more flexible and efficient enforcement: First, it provides independent federal jurisdiction.73 
Second, parties have a three-year statute of limitations to initiate enforcement proceedings 
rather than the one-year period allotted by the FAA.74 Third, the Convention allows a court to 
compel parties to arbitrate in or outside of the United States, whereas the FAA limits a court 
to compel parties to arbitrate “within the district.”75 The Convention’s broader application 
will provide more legal options for American parties, both domestically and abroad, and will 
                                                                                                                               
 63. Lander Co. v. MMP Invs., Inc. (Lander II), 107 F.3d 476, 478 (7th Cir. 1997). 
 64. Lander I, 927 F. Supp. at 1079. 
 65. Id. at 1078. 
 66. Id. at 1080–81 (emphasis added). 
 67. Lander II, 107 F.3d at 482 (emphasis added). 
 68. Id. at 481–82. 
 69. See Georges R. Delaume, Non-Domestic US Awards Qualify for Recognition under the New York 
Convention, 1 INT’L BUS. L.J. 102, 102–03 (1998) (citing Fuller Co. v. Compagnie des Beauxites de 
Guinée, 421 F. Supp. 938 (W.D. Pa. 1976)). 
 70. Lander II, 107 F.3d at 481. 
 71. New York Convention, supra note 5, art. VII. Lander II, 107 F.3d at 481 (“[T]here is ‘no reason to 
assume that Congress did not intend to provide overlapping coverage between the Convention and 
the Federal Arbitration Act.’”) (quoting Bergesen v. Joseph Muller Corp., 710 F.2d 928, 934 (2d Cir. 
1983)). 
 72. Lander II, 107 F.3d at 481–82. 
 73. See 9 U.S.C. § 203 (2006) (implementing legislation offers independent federal jurisdiction for 
arbitration awards or agreements under the Convention). 
 74. 9 U.S.C. § 207 (2006); 9 U.S.C. § 9 (2006). 
 75. 9 U.S.C. § 206 (2006); 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2006). 
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make the United States a more attractive forum for foreign parties to conduct their 
arbitration. 
2. Refusal to Recognize or Enforce Non-Domestic Awards Pursuant to the 
New York Convention 
Each member state of the New York Convention shall recognize arbitral awards as 
binding and enforce them pursuant to the procedural rules of the territory in which the 
award is relied upon.76 Article III further specifies that in recognizing or enforcing arbitral 
awards, member states cannot impose substantially more onerous conditions or additional 
fees or charges than are imposed on recognizing or enforcing domestic arbitral awards.77 
More significantly, once characterized as a Convention award, Article V enumerates seven 
grounds for refusing to recognize or enforce an arbitral award at the request of the party 
against whom the award is invoked. These defenses however are construed narrowly “to 
encourage the recognition and enforcement of commercial arbitration agreements in 
international contracts.”78 
Section 1 provides the first five, where the party against whom the award is invoked must 
furnish proof to the competent authority where recognition and enforcement is sought that: 
 (a) The parties to the agreement referred to in article II were, under the law 
applicable to them, under some incapacity, or the said agreement is not valid under the 
law to which the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication thereon, under the 
law of the country where the award was made; or 
 (b) The party against whom the award is invoked was not given proper notice of the 
appointment of the arbitrator or of the arbitration proceedings or was otherwise unable 
to present his case;[79] or 
 (c) The award deals with a difference not contemplated by or not falling within the 
terms of the submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters beyond the 
scope of the submission to arbitration, provided that, if the decisions on matters 
submitted to arbitration can be separated from those not so submitted, that part of the 
award which contains decisions on matters submitted to arbitration may be recognized 
and enforced; or 
                                                                                                                               
 76. New York Convention, supra note 5, art. III. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Karaha Bodas Co. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara, 364 F.3d 274, 288 
(5th Cir. 2004) (quoting Imperial Ethiopian Gov’t v. Baruch-Foster Corp., 535 F.2d 334, 335 (5th Cir. 
1976). 
 79. See Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Société Générale de L’Industrie du Papier, 508 F.2d 969 
(2d Cir. 1974) (holding that the petitioner was not prohibited from presenting its case where an 
arbitral tribunal refused to accommodate a key witness’s schedule). The court concluded that: 
The arbitration tribunal acted within its discretion in declining to reschedule a hearing for 
the convenience of [the petitioner’s] witness. [The petitioners’] due process rights under 
American law, rights entitled to full force under the Convention as a defense to enforcement, 
were in no way infringed by the tribunal’s decision. 
 Id. at 976. See also Geotech Lizenz AG v. Evergreen Systems, Inc., 697 F. Supp. 1248, 1253 
(E.D.N.Y. 1988) (finding that the defendant was not denied the opportunity to present its defenses 
under Article V(1)(b) when it had notice of an arbitration, but chose not to respond by failing to 
appear or present witnesses at a scheduled arbitration). 
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 (d) The composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral procedure was not in 
accordance with the agreement of the parties, or, failing such agreement, was not in 
accordance with the law of the country where the arbitration took place;[80] or 
 (e) The award has not yet become binding on the parties, or has been set aside or 
suspended by a competent authority of the country in which, or under the law of which, 
that award was made.[81]82 
Section 2 articulates the remaining two grounds:  
Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may also be refused if the competent 
authority in the country where recognition and enforcement is sought finds that: 
 (a) The subject matter of the difference is not capable of settlement by arbitration 
under the law of that country; or 
 (b) The recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public 
policy of that country.83 
3. Grounds for Vacatur of both Domestic FAA and Non-Domestic Awards 
pursuant to the FAA 
Sections 10 and 11 of the FAA set forth the grounds for vacating and modifying arbitral 
awards. A motion to vacate, modify, or correct an award must be served upon the adverse 
party or his attorney within three months after the award is filed or delivered.84 It is 
important to note that § 10 only applies to vacating the award, and not the arbitral 
agreement.85 The court in and for the district wherein the award was made may vacate the 
award: 
 (1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means; 
 (2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of 
them;[86] 
                                                                                                                               
 80. See Encyclopaedia Universalis S.A. v. Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., 403 F.3d 85, 91–92 (2d Cir. 
2005) (holding a foreign arbitration award unenforceable under Article V(1)(d) where a third 
arbitrator was appointed (when the agreement expressly provided for only two) because “the 
composition of the arbitral authority was not in accordance with the parties’ agreement”); Industrial 
Risk Insurers v. M.A.N. Gutehoffnungshütte GmbH, 141 F.3d 1434, 1442–44 (11th Cir. 1998) 
(concluding that the panel’s consideration of the late-filed report did not constitute a circumstance 
where “the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties” under 
Article V(1)(d)). 
 81. See Termorio S.A. E.S.P. v. Electranta S.P., 487 F.3d 928 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (affirming dismissal of 
enforcement proceeding where a court in Colombia, the country where the arbitration took place, 
had vacated the arbitral award). But see Chromalloy Aeroservices v. Arab Republic of Egypt, 939 F. 
Supp. 907 (D.D.C. 1996) (refusing to recognize the decision of the Egyptian court to nullify an award 
because doing so would violate clear United States public policy in favor of arbitration). 
 82. New York Convention, supra note 5, art. V(1). 
 83. Id. at art. V(2). 
 84. 9 U.S.C. § 12 (2006). 
 85. See Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 583–84 (2008) (holding that the FAA provides the 
exclusive statutory grounds for vacating or modifying arbitration awards and prohibits parties from 
expanding those grounds by agreement). 
 86. See Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145 (1968) (highlighting 
evident partiality, where a supposedly neutral third arbitrator had served as an expert consultant 
for one of the parties involved in the dispute). Those aware of this relationship did not disclose it 
until after the award was rendered. The lower courts refused to set the challenged award aside, but 
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 (3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the 
hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and 
material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any 
party have been prejudiced; or 
 (4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that 
a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not 
made.[87]88 
Additionally, where the award was “vacated and the time within which the agreement 
required the award to be made has not expired, the court may in its discretion, direct a 
rehearing by the arbitrators.”89 
The courts however, in following a well-established policy that their function to vacate 
arbitral awards should be limited, interpret the scope of § 10 grounds very narrowly. In 
National Oil Corp. v. Libyan Sun Oil Company, National Oil (a corporation owned by the 
Libyan Government) and Sun Oil (a Delaware corporation) entered into an oil exploration 
and production sharing agreement.90 After the U.S. government banned imports from and 
restricted exports to Libya, Sun Oil invoked the force majeure provision and suspended 
performance.91 National Oil sought enforcement after a foreign arbitral award was issued in 
its favor, but Sun Oil raised a number of objections including fraud and the arbitrators’ 
exceeding their powers pursuant to §§ 10(a)(1) and 10(a)(4).92 In protecting the finality of 
arbitration decisions, courts must be “slow to vacate an arbitral award on the ground of 
fraud.”93 The alleged fraud must not have been discoverable upon exercising due diligence 
prior to arbitration and it must also relate to a material issue.94 The court in Libyan Sun 
emphasized that the Convention “encourage[s] the recognition and enforcement of 
commercial arbitration agreements in international contracts and to unify the standards by 
                                                                                                                               
the Supreme Court, in reversing, applied its reasoning in Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927), where 
“a decision should be set aside where there is ‘the slightest pecuniary interest’ on the part of the 
judge” and finding “no basis for refusing to find the same concept in the broad statutory language 
that governs arbitration proceedings and provides that an award can be set aside on the basis of 
‘evident partiality’ or the use of ‘undue means.’ ” Commonwealth, 393 U.S. at 148. This provision 
demonstrates Congress’ desire to provide not merely for any arbitration, but for an impartial one. 
Id. The Court further emphasized to “be even more scrupulous to safeguard the impartiality of 
arbitrators than judges, since the former have completely free rein to decide the law as well as the 
facts and are not subject to appellate review.” Id. at 149. 
 87. See Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. v. Intel Corp., 9 Cal. 4th 362 at 367 (1994) (holding that “in the 
absence of specific restrictions in an arbitration agreement, the remedy that an arbitrator fashions 
does not exceed his or her powers if it bears a rational relationship to the underlying contract as 
interpreted, expressly or impliedly, by the arbitrator and to the breach of contract found, expressly 
or impliedly by the arbitrator”). In other words, the question with regard to remedies is not whether 
the arbitrator has rationally interpreted the parties’ agreement, but whether the remedy chosen is 
rationally drawn from the contract as so interpreted. Arbitrators have free rein to support their 
decision with broad principles of justice and equity if the remedy bears some rational relationship to 
the contract and breach. 
 88. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (2006). 
 89. Id. § 10. 
 90. 733 F. Supp. 800 (D. Del. 1990). 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 814 (quoting Dogherra v. Safeway Stores, Inc. 679 F.2d 1293, 1297 (9th Cir. 1982). 
 94. Id.  
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which agreements to arbitrate are observed and arbitral awards are enforced in the signatory 
countries” and held that Sun Oil failed to successfully assert its defenses because there was 
no material fraud in the proceeding.95 
In terms of Sun Oil’s allegation that the arbitrators exceeded their authority, the court 
relied on Mutual Fire, Marine & Inland Insurance Co. v. Norad Reinsurance Co.’s description 
of the inquiry a court should make: 
In conducting our review we must examine both the form of relief awarded by the 
arbitrator as well as the terms of that relief. We must determine if the form of the 
arbitrators’ award can be rationally derived either from the agreement between the 
parties or from the parties submissions [sic] to the arbitrators. In addition, the terms of 
the arbitral award will not be subject to judicial revision unless they are “completely 
irrational.”96 
Article V(1)(c) follows the more detailed § 10(d) of the FAA, which authorizes vacating an 
award “where the arbitrators exceeded their powers.”97 Like other Convention defenses to 
enforcement, this defense has a well-established policy to be narrowly construed.98 Its 
counterpart, § 10(d) of the FAA, has also been given a narrow reading.99 
In addition to the statutory grounds for vacatur, common law has established implied 
grounds for which arbitral awards may be denied when the award stands in violation of 
public policy. It must be noted however, that judicial review of an arbitral award is still very 
restrictive and the power to vacate an award upon common law grounds is narrowly tailored 
for limited applicability.100 This is so because the courts have recognized, in the enactment of 
                                                                                                                               
 95. Libyan Sun Oil Co., 733 F. Supp. at 813 (citing Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 520 n.15 
(1974)). 
 96. Id. at 817 (quoting Mutual Fire, Marine & Inland Ins. Co. v. Norad Reinsurance Co., 868 F.2d 52, 56 
(3d Cir. 1989)) (emphasis in original) (alteration in original). 
 97. Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Société Générale de L’Industrie du Papier, 508 F.2d 969, 976 
(2d Cir. 1974). 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. See Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008) (supporting limited judicial intervention 
with respect to vacating arbitral awards). In this case, toy manufacturer Mattel was sued by its 
landlord Hall Street Associates over a dispute concerning Mattel’s property lease. The parties’ 
arbitration agreement atypically allowed the District Court to override the arbitrator’s decision if 
“the arbitrator’s conclusions of law are erroneous.” Id. at 579. The arbitrator rendered a decision in 
favor of Mattel. Hall Street sought review from the district court, which found that the arbitrator’s 
decision contained legally erroneous conclusions. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit ruled that even if the 
arbitrator committed legal errors, it was not the place of the courts to review the soundness of the 
arbitrator’s decision. The exception provided for in the parties’ arbitration agreement granted the 
federal courts a much broader role in supervising the arbitration than is specifically allowed in the 
FAA. The FAA explicitly provides for only a narrow set of circumstances under which courts can 
override an arbitration award, such as corruption, partiality, or misbehavior on the part of the 
arbitrator. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2006). The Ninth Circuit viewed the FAA’s list of circumstances meriting 
judicial review as an exclusive list. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and in a 6–3 decision, 
rejected any sort of expansion (not only that parties to a contract cannot expand, but even the courts 
cannot expand it, and not even for extraordinary circumstances) of the limited scope of judicial 
review stated in §§ 10 and 11 of the FAA: 
We think . . . the text compels a reading of the §§ 10 and 11 categories as exclusive . . . 
“fraud” and a mistake of law are not cut from the same cloth . . . . That aside, expanding the 
detailed categories would rub too much against the grain of the § 9 language, where 
provision for judicial confirmation carries no hint of flexibility. On application for an order 
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the FAA, a legislative intent of a strong federal principle that respects and defers to voluntary 
arbitration, particularly within the commercial context. The purpose of passing the FAA was 
to provide an alternative to the complications of litigation. Reevaluating the merits of a 
particular remedy by the courts would thus diminish this purpose by fueling more litigation. 
Judicial intervention would also undermine the parties’ initial contractual expectation of a 
final and binding decision based on the selected arbitrators’—and not some arbitrary 
judge’s—best judgment.101 
For example, the argument that a non-domestic arbitral award is not expressly grounded 
in a foreign jurisdiction does not serve as a sufficient reason for vacating the award. In 
Chromalloy, a dispute between a U.S. company and the Republic of Egypt led to an arbitral 
award rendered in favor of the U.S. company. “Egypt’s complaint that ‘[t]he arbitral award is 
null under Arbitration Law, . . . because it is not properly “grounded” under Egyptian law,’ 
reflects [its] suspicious view of arbitration, and is precisely the type of technical argument 
that U.S. courts are not to entertain when reviewing an arbitral award.”102 The United States 
is “well past the time when judicial suspicion of the desirability of arbitration and of the 
competence of arbitral tribunals inhibited the development of arbitration as an alternative 
means of dispute resolution.”103 
a. Violation of Public Policy 
A court’s refusal to enforce an arbitrator’s award because it is contrary to public policy is a 
specific application of the more general doctrine rooted in common law that a court may 
refuse to enforce contracts that violate law or public policy.104 Public policy arguments under 
the Convention should be accepted with “caution, so as not to discourage enforcement of 
United States arbitration awards by courts of other countries.”105 Under the Convention, U.S. 
courts have found “public policy” to refer to “the most basic notions of morality and justice.”106 
The Supreme Court has since clarified that a court’s refusal to enforce an arbitrator’s 
interpretation of a contract is limited to situations where the contract as interpreted would 
                                                                                                                               
confirming the arbitration award, the court “must grant” the order “unless the award is 
vacated, modified, or corrected as prescribed in §§ 10 and 11 of this title.” There is nothing 
malleable about “must grant,” which unequivocally tells courts to grant confirmation in 
all cases, except when one of the “prescribed” exceptions applies. This does not sound 
remotely like a provision meant to tell a court what to do just in case the parties say 
nothing else.  
 Hall St. 552 U.S. 576, 586–87. “Instead of fighting the text, it makes more sense to see the three 
provisions, §§ 9–11, as substantiating a national policy favoring arbitration with just the limited 
review needed to maintain arbitration’s essential virtue of resolving disputes straightaway.” Id. at 
588.  
 101. Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 271–72 (2004). 
 102. Chromalloy Aeroservices v. Arab Republic of Egypt, 939 F. Supp. 907, 911 (D.D.C. 1996) (omission 
in original). 
 103. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626–27 (1985). 
 104. United Paperworkers Int’l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 36–37 (1987). 
 105. MGM Prods. Grp., Inc. v. Aeroflot Russian Airlines, 573 F. Supp. 2d 772 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), aff’d, 91 F. 
App’x 716 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 106. Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Société Générale de L’Industrie du Papier, 508 F.2d 969, 974 
(2d Cir. 1974). 
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violate some explicit public policy that is well defined and dominant, and not from general 
considerations of supposed public interests.107 In United Paperworkers International Union v. 
Misco, Inc., the arbitrator determined that Cooper, an employee of Misco, Inc., did not violate 
company policy by his use or possession of marijuana on company property, and ordered 
Cooper’s reinstatement.108 The district court vacated the award and the Fifth Circuit 
affirmed, holding that reinstatement would violate public policy against operation of 
dangerous machinery by persons under the influence of drugs.109 The Supreme Court 
reversed and held that the Fifth Circuit’s formulation of public policy did not comply with the 
requirement that such policy must be ascertained in reference to concrete laws and legal 
precedents and not from general arbitrary considerations of supposed public interests.110 
In Seymour v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, the insured party challenged the arbitral award 
because the insurer’s unilateral modification of the original policy was contrary to public 
policy, where an insurance policy may not be modified to reduce benefits unless parties agree 
in writing.111 The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court order confirming the award 
because appellants failed to show that the alleged public policy was grounded in established 
law. The court further articulated that so long as an arbitrator draws his decision from the 
parties’ agreements, a reviewing court is generally precluded from disturbing the award.112 A 
federal court may not overrule an arbitrator’s decision simply because the court believes its 
own interpretation would be a better one.113 If a court is to disturb an award, it can only do so 
under strict statutory or judicially-created standards.114 
This narrow interpretation of the public policy defense was reiterated by the court in 
Libyan Sun Oil, where “enforcement would violate the forum state’s most basic notions of 
morality and justice.”115 Sun Oil argued that confirming the award against it would be 
inconsistent with U.S. anti-terrorism policy, but the court rejected this in declaring that 
“ ‘public policy’ and ‘foreign policy’ are not synonymous.”116 The Second Circuit addressed this 
very issue in Parsons: “[t]o read the public policy defense as a parochial device protective of 
national political interests would seriously undermine the Convention’s utility. This provision 
was not meant to enshrine the vagaries of international politics under the rubric of ‘public 
policy.’ ”117 Here, the court held that National Oil, as an entity owned by a recognized foreign 
government, was entitled to access U.S. courts regardless of the state of diplomatic relations 
                                                                                                                               
 107. Misco, 484 U.S. at 43. See also Indus. Risk Insurers v. M.A.N. Gutehoffnungshutte GmbH, 141 F.3d 
1434, 1445 (11th Cir. 1998). 
 108. Misco, 484 U.S. at 44.  
 109. Id. at 29. 
 110. Id. at 43–44. 
 111. Seymour v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, 988 F.2d 1020 (10th Cir. 1993). 
 112. Id. at 1022 (quoting Misco, 484 U.S. at 36). See also Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 
363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960). 
 113. Seymour, 988 F.2d at 1023 (quoting W.R. Grace and Co. v. Local Union No. 759, 461 U.S. 757, 764 
(1983)). 
 114. BRUNET ET AL., supra note 11, at 566. 
 115. Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Société Générale de L’Industrie du Papier, 508 F.2d 969, 974 
(2d Cir. 1974). See also Waterside Ocean Navigation Co. v. Int’l Navigation Ltd., 737 F.2d 150, 152 
(2d Cir. 1984). 
 116. National Oil Corp. v. Libyan Sun Oil Co., 733 F. Supp. 800, 819 (D. Del. 1990). 
 117. Id. (quoting Parsons, 508 F.2d at 974). 
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when the U.S. President had neither declared war on, nor derecognized that foreign 
government.118 Although Sun Oil argued that enforcement of the award would result in U.S. 
dollars financing terrorist exploits, the President is the one empowered to prevent such a 
transfer through the Libyan Sanctions Regulations.119 Libya’s terrorist tactics toward 
international commercial arbitration are completely beside the point.120 
A violation of public policy may serve as grounds for vacating an arbitral award, but it is 
important to note that “U.S. public policy in favor of final and binding arbitration of 
commercial disputes is unmistakable, and supported by treaty, statute, and case law.”121 The 
requirements for enforcement of a foreign judgment are that there is “proper service of 
process and that the original claim not violate U.S. public policy.”122 “The [FAA] ‘and the 
implementation of the Convention in the same year by amendment of the [FAA],’ 
demonstrate that there is an ‘emphatic federal policy in favor of arbitral dispute resolution’ 
particularly ‘in the field of international commerce.’ ”123 For instance, the district court in 
Chromalloy had already found the arbitral award “proper as a matter of U.S. law, and that 
the arbitration agreement between Egypt and [Chromalloy] precluded an appeal in Egyptian 
courts.”124 Recognizing the decision of the Egyptian court to nullify the arbitral award 
therefore would violate clear U.S. public policy favoring final and binding arbitration. 
C. Reconciling the FAA and the New York Convention 
Some parties have raised the issue of whether U.S. courts are even authorized to apply 
provisions of the FAA to non-domestic awards issued in the United States pursuant to the 
Convention’s Article V(1)(e). The Second Circuit in Alghanim found that awards rendered in 
the United States trigger Article V(1)(e) where the awards that “ha[ve] been set aside or 
suspended by a competent authority of the country in which, or under the law of which, that 
award was made” are construed to mean that courts in the country where the arbitration was 
conducted are allowed to apply domestic arbitral law to a motion to set aside or vacate those 
arbitral awards.125 In other words, it appears that the FAA and the Convention do not 
conflict as much as operate in tandem. For example, in Sole Resorts, the district court found, 
because the disputed arbitration award was rendered through judgment of a domestic 
arbitration panel, that the case was governed by the FAA rather than the Convention.126 The 
parties, however, agreed that the Convention would govern because the arbitration involved 
two foreign corporations and a property located outside the United States.127 The Second 
Circuit held that the determination of this issue would make no substantive difference in the 
                                                                                                                               
 118. Id. at 807. 
 119. Id. at 820. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Chromalloy Aeroservices v. Arab Republic of Egypt, 939 F. Supp. 907, 913 (D.D.C. 1996). 
 122. Id. (quoting Tahan v. Hodgson, 662 F.2d 862, 864 (D.C. Cir. 1981)). 
 123. Id. (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 631 (1985)). 
 124. Id. 
 125. See Yusuf Ahmed Alghanim & Sons, W.L.L. v. Toys “R” Us, Inc., 126 F.3d 15, 21 n.3 (2d Cir. 1997); 
Spector v. Torenberg, 852 F. Supp. 201, 205–06 & n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). 
 126. Sole Resort, S.A. de C.V. v. Allure Resorts Mgmt., LLC, 450 F.3d 100, 102 n.1 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 127. See Alghanim & Sons, 126 F.3d at 19. 
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analysis of the case as the FAA and the Convention have “ ‘overlapping coverage’ to the 
extent that they do not conflict.”128 
In practice, it appears that Article V(1)(e) does not pose a serious challenge to the 
enforcement of non-domestic awards rendered in the United States pursuant to the FAA. The 
interaction and application of the Convention and the FAA are fairly consistent with one 
another. In Chromalloy, the court supported the interpretation of the Convention and the 
FAA’s coexisting operation. Chromalloy, a U.S. corporation, entered into a military 
procurement contract with Egypt, where the parties subsequently entered into arbitration 
over a contract termination dispute.129 The arbitral panel rendered an award favorable to 
Chromalloy, and when Chromalloy petitioned to enforce the award in district court, Egypt 
appealed to the Egyptian Court of Appeal for award nullification.130 When the Egyptian 
Court of Appeal nullified the award, Egypt proceeded to file a motion to dismiss Chromalloy’s 
petition to enforce.131 Egypt deferred to Article V(1)(e) of the Convention providing that 
recognition and enforcement of an award may be refused if there is proof that the award has 
been set aside by a competent authority of the country in which, or under the law of which, 
that award was made.132 On the other hand,  
 While Article V provides a discretionary standard, Article VII of the Convention 
requires that, “The provisions of the present Convention shall not . . . deprive any 
interested party of any right he may have to avail himself of an arbitral award in the 
manner and to the extent allowed by the law . . . of the count[r]y where such award is 
sought to be relied upon.”133  
In other words, if the Convention did not exist, the FAA would provide Chromalloy with a 
legitimate claim to enforcement of the arbitral award.134 Egypt argued that using Article VII 
to invoke the FAA contradicts the Convention by creating an impermissible conflict under 9 
U.S.C. § 208, and thereby eliminating all consideration under Article V.135 In its attempt to 
reconcile the conflict between Articles V and VII, the district court determined that when two 
statutes are capable of coexistence, it is the duty of the courts to regard each as effective.136 
Article V provides a permissive standard under which a court may refuse to enforce an award 
and Article VII mandates that the court must consider claims under applicable local law; yet, 
Article VII does not eliminate all consideration of Article V.137 Since the arbitral award in 
Chromalloy was valid as a matter of U.S. law, Article VII merely required the court to protect 
Chromalloy’s rights under domestic U.S. laws.138 There is no conflict between Chromalloy’s 
use of Article VII to invoke the FAA and the language of the Convention.139 
                                                                                                                               
 128. Id. at 20. 
 129. Chromalloy, 939 F. Supp. at 908. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at 909. 
 133. Id. (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 201) (alterations in original). 
 134. Id. (citing 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–14). 
 135. Id. at 914 (citing Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528, 530 (1995)). 
 136. Id.  
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III. Enforcing Foreign-Related Arbitral Awards Rendered in the 
 People’s Republic of China 
A. CIETAC and CMAC: The International Arbitration Institutions of 
the PRC 
The China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Committee (CIETAC) and the 
China Maritime Arbitration Commission (CMAC) are presently the two chief international 
arbitration institutions in China for arbitrating disputes involving foreign elements.140 
CIETAC handles all types of general commercial disputes, whereas CMAC addresses 
maritime disputes.141 Both CIETAC and CMAC are products of the 1950s, when the Soviet 
Union model greatly influenced China.142 
The earliest embodiment of CIETAC was established in 1956 as FTAC, or the Foreign 
Trade Arbitration Commission.143 FTAC’s jurisdiction was confined to disputes arising from 
international trade transactions with foreign companies or other economic organizations as 
one party, and Chinese companies or other economic organizations, as the other.144 In 1980, 
FTAC was renamed FETAC, or the Foreign Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission, 
where the State Council expanded its jurisdiction to include disputes arising from various 
aspects of China’s economic relationships with foreign countries, such as disputes related to 
and arising from Chinese and foreign joint venture investments.145 In 1988, FETAC amended 
its name to CIETAC, and CIETAC was ultimately permitted to take cognizance of all 
disputes arising from international economic and trade transactions.146 
Parallel to FTAC, the Maritime Arbitration Commission (MAC) was established in 1959 as 
the dedicated arbitral institution for the resolution of maritime disputes.147 After a series of 
amendments that broadened its scope of jurisdiction in 1982 and 1983, MAC was renamed 
CMAC in 1983.148 As of June 1988, CMAC has exercised jurisdiction over: 
- disputes regarding the remuneration for salvage services rendered by sea-going 
vessels to each other or by a sea-going vessel to a river craft and vice versa; 
- disputes arising from collisions between sea-going vessels or between sea-going 
vessels and river crafts or from damages caused by sea-going vessels to harbour 
structures or installations; and 
- disputes arising from chartering sea-going vessels, agency services rendered to sea-
going vessels, carriage by sea by virtue of contracts of affreightment, bill of lading 
or other shipping documents, as well as disputes arising from maritime 
insurance.149 
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B. Legal Authority for Enforcement of Foreign-Related Awards 
“Prior to the introduction of the Arbitration Law, foreign-related awards merely referred to 
awards rendered by the two foreign-related arbitration institutions: CIETAC and CMAC.”150 
This remained unchanged until the Trial Civil Procedure Law took effect, where Article 195 
addressed the matter of enforcing arbitral awards rendered by foreign-related arbitral 
commissions by providing the following provision: 
 When one of the parties concerned fails to comply with an award made by a foreign-
related arbitration institution of the People’s Republic of China, the other party may 
request that the award be executed in accordance with the provisions of this article by 
the Intermediate People’s Court at the place where the arbitration institution is located 
or where the property is located.151 
This provision is significant for several reasons. First, the provision does not articulate 
grounds upon which the court may refuse enforcement: the authority of the court was 
restricted to only issuing orders to execute the respective arbitral awards.152 Consequently, 
the court had no legal basis upon which to refuse recognition and enforcement of a foreign-
related award.153 Furthermore, to enforce an award, the successful party had to apply to the 
court at the place where the arbitral institution or the property was located, which as a 
practical matter, led all applications for enforcement to be submitted to the Intermediate 
People’s Court in Beijing, where CIETAC and CMAC are both headquartered.154 
In 1991, the Civil Procedure Law made significant amendments to the Trial Civil 
Procedure Law, with new provisions further supplementing the enforcement of foreign-
related awards rendered in China.155 Article 257 provides that if a party fails to comply with 
the terms of an arbitral award that is rendered by a foreign-related arbitral institution, the 
other party may initiate enforcement proceedings with the Intermediate People’s Court.156 
Furthermore, the Intermediate People’s Court empowered to exercise such jurisdiction shall 
be the Intermediate People’s Court located in the jurisdiction where: 
- the person subject to the enforcement proceedings has its domicile or its place of 
residence, as concerns natural persons, or as concerns legal persons, the location of 
their registered address or their principal place of business; 
- the person subject to the enforcement proceedings has no place of domicile, place of 
residence or principal place of business, but has property within the territory of 
China, the location of the said property.157 
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1. Defining “Foreign-Related” 
The New York Convention divides awards into (1) foreign awards and (2) non-domestic 
awards.158 The Chinese Arbitration Law, on the other hand, distinguishes among three types 
of awards: (1) domestic awards; (2) foreign awards rendered outside of China; and (3) foreign-
related awards or awards made by CIETAC or CMAC involving a “foreign element.”159 There 
is no definition of “non-domestic” award provided in the Civil Procedure Law.160 A Supreme 
People’s Court opinion has articulated nevertheless, the following factors that it would 
interpret to constitute a “foreign-related” award: “(1) one of both parties are foreign nationals, 
stateless persons or foreign companies or organizations; (2) the legal actions leading to the 
formation, amendment or termination of a legal relationship occurred in a foreign country; or 
(3) the subject matter is located in a foreign country.”161 
A “non-domestic” award pursuant to the Convention would appear to be synonymous with 
a “foreign-related” award under the Arbitration Law, but they may not be considered a 
substitute of one another in a strict sense, because theoretically, if one applies the Convention 
test of “nationality” or territoriality,” then all “foreign-related awards” would be classified ipso 
facto as “domestic awards” in China as they are rendered by Chinese arbitration institutions 
within China.162 Yet, the situation is quite the opposite: as foreign-related awards involve 
“foreign elements,” Chinese arbitration law regards them as “quasi-convention awards” and 
thus treats them in a more favorable manner than “domestic awards.”163 The Civil Procedure 
Law draws an explicit distinction between “domestic award” and “foreign-related award.”164 
Though the Arbitration Law does not make this express distinction, it sets forth special 
provisions that are only applicable to “foreign-related” awards.165 
2. Grounds for the Setting Aside or Non-Enforcement of a Foreign-
Related Award 
Pursuant to Articles 70 and 71 of the Arbitration Law, where a motion for the setting 
aside or the non-enforcement of a foreign-related arbitral award is supported by sufficient 
evidence to prove one of the circumstances set forth in Article 258 of the Civil Procedure Law, 
the Intermediate People’s Court must then form a collegiate bench to decide upon the 
motion.166 
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If the evidence is satisfactory, the court is required to order the non-enforcement of the 
award.167 The most noteworthy aspect of the motion for the non-enforcement of a foreign-
related award is that the Intermediate People’s Court of the location of the arbitration 
institution exercises jurisdiction over these motions, and not the Intermediate Court in 
charge of enforcing the arbitral award.168 In other words, a motion to enforce an arbitral 
award falls under the jurisdiction of the Intermediate People’s Court where the individual 
subject to enforcement proceedings is domiciled, his/her place of residence, or the location of 
his/her property in China,169 whereas a motion of non-enforcement of the award falls under 
the jurisdiction of the Intermediate People’s Court of the location of the arbitral institution.170 
For example, the Shanghai No. 2 Intermediate People’s Court accepts and exercises 
jurisdiction over applications for the non-enforcement of awards rendered by the Shanghai 
sub-commission of CIETAC.171 
In terms of the potential conflict between the cross-filing of motions—one to enforce an 
award and one for non-enforcement of the same award—Article 64 of the Arbitration Law 
provides that an application to set aside an arbitral award will result in the suspension of any 
enforcement proceedings pertaining to the award.172 In essence, a motion for non-
enforcement of an award—regardless of when it was filed—may temporarily or even 
permanently preempt any motion to enforce the same award.173 If the court rules to set aside 
the award, the court hearing the motion to enforce is obligated to terminate the enforcement 
procedure.174 If the application for non-enforcement is rejected, the enforcement procedure 
may subsequently resume.175 
Since the progress of a motion to enforce rests entirely upon the ruling on the motion for 
non-enforcement, Article 64 appears to be more partial to the party filing for non-
enforcement, by allowing this party to effectively interrupt and stay the prevailing party’s (of 
the arbitration itself) enforcement efforts until a decision on non-enforcement is made. On the 
other hand, it may be argued that this provision accelerates and thereby makes the entire 
enforcement/non-enforcement process more efficient—instead of waiting until one 
Intermediate Court decides upon the matter of enforcement before filing a non-enforcement 
motion by the party upon whom the order to carry out the arbitral award is placed, the 
opportunity to raise a non-enforcement motion saves time and judicial resources. In any case, 
if the court denies the motion for non-enforcement, the court under which the motion for 
enforcement is pending will thus proceed with its relevant hearing. 
                                                                                                                               
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Civ. P. Law of the People’s Republic of China.  
 170. Id. art. 258. 
 171. TAO, supra note 140, at 172. 
 172. Id. at 173 (citing Arb. Law of the People’s Republic of China, art. 64). 
 173. See id. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
 The Enforcement Methodology of Non-Domestic Arbitral Awards 
259 
With respect to the grounds to deny enforcement of a foreign-related award, Article 258176 
limits them to the following considerations: 
lack of a valid arbitration agreement; 
failure to notify the respondent to appoint an arbitrator or to proceed with the 
arbitration, or deprivation of the respondent of the opportunity to present his case due 
to reasons he is not responsible for; 
improper composition of the arbitral tribunal or lack of conformity of the arbitration 
proceedings with arbitration rules; 
matters decided exceed the scope of the arbitration agreement or the limits of authority 
of the arbitration institution; and 
enforcement of the award would contradict the social and public interest of China.177 
C. Reconciling the Civil Procedure Law and the Arbitration Law of 
1994 with the New York Convention 
Article I(1) of the New York Convention provides that the Convention shall also apply to 
arbitral awards not considered as domestic awards in the state where recognition and 
enforcement are sought.178 While ratifying the Convention however, China “elected to 
foreclose this possibility.”179 As a result, awards rendered in China are not eligible for 
enforcement inside China pursuant to the Convention—in China’s accession to the 
Convention, its adopted the “reciprocity reservation of the New York Convention, thereby 
confirming that the New York Convention shall only apply to arbitral awards made in the 
territory of other contracting states.”180 Though this specific provision of the Convention is 
inapplicable, China’s Civil Procedure Law addresses the enforcement of these awards in a 
manner that essentially mirrors the provisions in the Convention.181 
Yet the efficient and proper implementation of both China’s Civil Procedure Law and 
Arbitration Law depends on the correct understanding and handling of cases by judicial 
personnel.182 There already exists a record of foreign-related arbitral awards that have been 
erroneously set aside and/or denied enforcement by the corresponding Intermediate People’s 
courts, raising questions of the competence of China’s judiciary to effectively implement its 
own laws, and in conjunction with the New York Convention.183 For instance, the New York 
Convention is rarely taught in Chinese law schools and translations of it in Chinese are not 
widely disseminated.184 Additionally, it is well established that the courts’ lack of 
effectiveness in enforcing arbitral awards is due to a variety of other social and institutional 
reasons such as poor efficiency of the courts, low quality of judges (especially within the lower 
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courts), a lack of judicial dependence, administrative intervention, the (infamous) influence of 
guan xi, or personal relations, bias toward foreign parties, and most significantly, local 
protectionism.185 
Local protectionism in China has seriously challenged judicial independence and its ability 
to reform.186 It is usually the root cause for the unduly delay and impediments to enforcing 
foreign-related awards because the local courts depend on local governments for personnel 
and financial support while local governments rely on local companies for revenue.187 This 
interest becomes a high priority when the enforcement of an award could risk economic ruin 
for a small to medium-sized town heavily or even entirely dependent on a target company’s 
operations and financial welfare.188 Protecting the local companies from enforcement—to 
submit to and carry out a potentially detrimental award—is in turn, to protect the courts 
themselves.189 
Such local protectionist tendencies can often be observed in the spurious justifications for 
the denial of enforcement, such as the invocation of the “social and public interest of China,” 
as was articulated in the 1992 decision of Dongfeng Garments Factory of Kai Feng City and 
Tai Chun International Trade (HK) Co. Ltd. v. Henan Garments Import and Export Group 
Co. by the Zhengzhou Intermediate People’s Court.190 In Chinese law, unlike the FAA and 
New York Convention, there is no such phrase as “public policy.”191 Instead, Article 260 of the 
Arbitration Law uses “social and public interest in China,” interpreted by its domestic 
standard, or the basic legal and moral rule of China.192 There is no notion with respect to 
“international public interest or public policy.”193 In Dongfeng, CIETAC rendered an award in 
favor of the plaintiff, a Hong Kong company.194 The plaintiff thereafter sought to enforce the 
award in the local court in China, which refused on the basis that “according to current State 
policies and regulations, enforcement . . . [it] would seriously harm the economic influence of 
the State and public interest of the society, and adversely affect the foreign trade order of this 
State.”195 The justification of this decision would appear to be that the defendant was a major 
economic force in the locality of Zhengzhou, where the court sat, and that forcing the 
defendant to pay substantial damages was seen as detrimental to the social and public 
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interest of Zhengzhou.196 This decision to deny enforcement, premised upon public interest, 
was ultimately overturned by the Supreme People’s Court, not on any grounds of 
“international public interest,” but that the local court should not see the enforcement of the 
award in this particular case as violating the “public interest in China.”197 Although the 
arbitral award was ultimately enforced in Dongfeng, the “social and public interest” defense 
to enforcement is not the same as the term “public policy” in the United States. U.S. courts 
have held that the public policy defense under the Convention applies only when 
“enforcement would violate the forum state’s most basic notions of morality and justice.”198 
On the other hand, “public interest” appears to be more broadly construed and may include 
any financial, cultural, environmental, or other interests so long as the interest is public and 
not concentrated toward any small group.199 Although the Arbitration Law does not expressly 
include public interest as a ground for denying the enforcement of a foreign-related award, its 
silence does not necessarily refute the public interest idea set forth in the Civil Procedure 
Law.200 Therefore, public interest provides a legitimate legal stance for the courts to use in 
denying enforcement.201 
While Chinese enforcement provisions appear to be structurally and procedurally sound, 
there has been a substantial amount of criticism with regard to the methodology of award 
enforcement.202 Critics point to Chinese refusal to enforce foreign-related awards due to 
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regional protectionist preferences. Such refusals have caused these critics to suggest that 
CIETAC awards are “paper tigers”203 and lead to “spotty at best” enforcement.204 
However, China has made an effort to view and treat foreign-related awards as quasi-
Convention awards, and thus treat them more favorably than it would domestic awards.205 
For instance, the Supreme People’s Court has implemented measures to guarantee and 
maintain more uniform interpretation and application of the New York Convention.206 Most 
notably, the Supreme People’s Court issued two notices that collectively require it to examine 
and confirm any judicial decision to deny enforcement of a foreign-related arbitral award or 
any judicial decision to set aside a foreign-related arbitral award rendered by a PRC based 
foreign-related arbitration institution.207 
The first notice, issued in 1995, established a Centralized Report and Review System 
(Prior Reporting System) covering all cases where an Intermediate People’s Court refuses to 
enforce or refuses to recognize and enforce a foreign-related arbitral award.208 Essentially, 
the contemplating court, before deciding to refuse recognition and/or enforcement, must 
report its findings to the Higher People’s Court within the same jurisdiction for review.209 If 
the Higher People’s Court also agrees that enforcement or recognition and enforcement 
should be refused, it must report its findings to the Supreme People’s Court.210 Only after the 
Supreme People’s Court approves the findings may the Intermediate People’s Court rule to 
refuse recognition and/or enforcement of the award.211 
The second notice, issued in 1998, established a Prior Reporting System that specifically 
addresses any decision of the Intermediate People’s Court to cancel a foreign-related arbitral 
award rendered by a PRC-based arbitration institution.212 If the court, in considering an 
application to cancel an award, determines that the award was rendered in any one or more 
of the circumstances established in Article 258 of the Civil Procedure Law, the court must 
refer the matter to the Higher People’s Court within thirty days of accepting the application, 
for a determination.213 Should the Higher People’s Court concur with the lower level court 
decision, it must, within fifteen days of receiving the application from the Intermediate 
People’s Court, submit an Approved Advice to the Supreme People’s Court and may not 
render any decision until the latter has rendered a response.214 
These two reporting systems do not apply to domestic arbitral awards, but only to foreign-
related awards.215 Furthermore, the prior reporting requirement only applies when the 
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People’s Court determines that enforcement of the foreign-related awards should be denied or 
cancelled.216 There is no requirement to report decisions for the enforcement of a foreign-
related award or the dismissal of applications for the cancellation of a foreign-related 
award.217 
The reporting system has been criticized for a variety of reasons, such as breaching the 
independence of the lower courts, and for its ineffective and inefficient procedure and limited 
application.218 On the other hand, this new system of centralized report and review, which 
creates a standard that is equal to if not more favorable than the Convention, reflects the 
Supreme People’s Court’s respect towards foreign-related arbitration.219 This system 
therefore has significantly reinforced the confidence of foreign investors, who had once feared 
that local protectionist preferences and tendencies may influence and unduly soil the 
enforcement the enforcement of arbitral awards in China.220 The reporting mechanism also 
represents the “highest level of power monopolization”: the power to refuse enforcement may 
only be exercised by the Supreme People’s Court.221 Therefore, when lower courts are 
requested to enforce a foreign-related award, the only meaningful decision they are able to 
make is an affirmative one and order enforcement.222 By adopting this mechanism, the 
uniformity of interpretation and application of the New York Convention will be better 
achieved since the adjudicating power rests ultimately only upon the Supreme People’s 
Court.223 Furthermore, the reporting system serves as an interim measure, created with the 
purpose to safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of arbitral award holders in an 
environment of local protectionism.224 Over time, as this problem diminishes, so will the need 
for such a mechanism.225 
IV.  Conclusion 
Overall, U.S. courts favor upholding the integrity of foreign-related arbitration through 
their exercise of imperium by enforcing the arbitral awards composed by arbitrators who lack 
this power. This is clearly witnessed through Congress’ enactment of the FAA, an 
enforcement mechanism that incorporates the New York Convention, as well as through the 
courts’ well-established preference to refrain from judicial intervention and construe the 
exceptions to enforcement and grounds for vacatur in a narrow and restrictive manner. 
On the other hand, since the New York Convention does not apply directly in U.S. courts 
but through the FAA, U.S. courts have greater discretion with respect to their determination 
of the application and scope of the two Conventions. The extent of domestic judicial 
interpretation and subsequent intervention, particularly in the context of enforcing or 
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vacating non-domestic arbitral awards, is challenging for domestic courts to assess. Even 
though the New York Convention sets forth the general parameters for domestic courts to 
follow, the goal of uniformity is compromised due in large part to broad indefinite language, 
inconsistent domestic implementation processes and varying judiciaries’ exercise of 
discretion. Achieving a uniform application of the New York Convention among the member 
states—even among different courts within one member state—is therefore not certain. 
Yet, the Convention has achieved much success thus far in that it is easier, and more 
efficient and practical to enforce a non-domestic arbitral award than it is to seek enforcement 
of a foreign court judgment. The risk for inconsistent domestic judicial intervention, in a 
domestic court’s implementation of the New York Convention interpreted through the FAA, is 
a small concern compared to the big picture of the Convention’s purpose and ability to 
encourage and promote the recognition and enforcement of foreign-related arbitral awards. 
The enforcement of the New York Convention through the FAA has provided American 
businesses with a widely used system to obtain domestic enforcement of international 
commercial arbitration awards, subject only to minimal standards of domestic judicial 
review.226 
With respect to the PRC, it is without a doubt that the foreign-related arbitral bodies—
CIETAC in particular—have, since their inception, more or less maneuvered their way to 
successful global institutionalization.227 From its preliminary stages of a Soviet model as 
FTAC, CIETAC today handles more international disputes than any arbitral body in the 
world.228 Given CIETAC’s record success at addressing and adapting to challenges it has 
faced, the likelihood of continued improvement and success is highly foreseeable. 
Nevertheless, CIETAC cannot do it alone with respect to the enforcement of its awards 
rendered.229 Enforcement reform within the court system must also occur if the PRC is to 
transform into a truly attractive venue for international arbitration.230 
In terms of the New York Convention, it is clear that the Chinese judicial commitment to 
uphold its implementation is strong.231 For further improvement, one legal scholar suggests 
that the Chinese legislature amend and unify its rules for the recognition and enforcement of 
foreign-related awards because the current discrepancies between the Civil Procedure Law 
and the Arbitration Law, and between Chinese rules and the Convention standards, create 
confusion, complications, and subsequent impediments.232 The present standards for 
recognition and enforcement of foreign-related awards in China do not significantly differ 
from the rules set forth pursuant to the Convention.233 The only key difference is that the 
term “public interest” in Article 260(2) of the Civil Procedure Law is more broadly construed 
and therefore not synonymous to the term “public policy” embodied within the Convention. 
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Yet, the later enacted 1994 Arbitration Law does not include the Civil Procedure Law’s 
“public interest” provision.234 Though it does not necessarily invalidate Article 260(2) of the 
Civil Procedure Law, this silence on the matter is indicative of the legislative intention to 
potentially amend Article 260(2) and fully adopt and incorporate the New York Convention 
standards in the near future.235 
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